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Abstract
Purpose: Pharmaceutical manufacturers execute quality control operations and Good Manufacturing
Practices (GMP) to provide safe drugs. The Federal Drug and Food Administration (FDA) is tasked with
ensuring manufacturers are performing such procedures. Faced with limited resources the FDA has
developed novel tools to aid supply chain oversight. This paper briefly reviews these tools.
Methods: Current inspection approaches employed by the FDA are identified by searching the FDA’s
guidelines, the Code of Federal Regulations, public reports and other online resources.
Outcomes:
Industry: A risk-based site selection model (SSM) is used to prioritize on-site inspections for FDA
investigators. Theoretically, the SSM allows FDA investigators to focus on firms that are at high risk of
failing to meet quality standards. Analytical testing of drugs is performed by FDA laboratories as well as
manufacturers’ laboratories. Despite this, two of the highest profile recalls in the last several years
(Valsartan and Ranitidine) were not initially identified by the FDA. Instead, Valisure, an online pharmacy
that tests each batch of inventory, detected the issues.
Physicians and Consumers: The FDA has provided easy-to-use online tools for patient and physician
reporting of drug quality problems. The FDA has also created consumer education campaigns to aid in
protecting patients from fraud and counterfeiting.
Conclusion: The FDA has developed novel methods of redistributing their workforce to maximize
product quality and consumer safety with limited resources. The methods include a risk-based SSM for
prioritizing on-site inspections, providing education tools, and online reporting of quality problems. FDA
laboratories also provide analytical testing to ensure purity standards are met. The recent publicized
discoveries of Valisure are leading other pharmacies such as the University of Kentucky Central
Pharmacy to begin testing incoming drugs. It is critical for these pharmacies and the FDA to cooperate to
protect the pharmaceutical supply chain moving forward.
Keywords: pharmaceutical manufacturing, FDA, CDER, FDA site selection tool, risk-based modeling, risk reduction, GxP,
cGMP, human drug manufacturing, drug surveillance, pharmaceutical supply chain, pharmacy-level investigators.
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Introduction
Visually detecting adulterated, defective, or contaminated pharmaceuticals is nearly
impossible (beyond cosmetic defects like a cracked vial). Instead, specialized and often destructive
analytical techniques such as liquid chromatography and mass spectrometry must be used to
identify adulterated products (Nikolin et al., 2004). For this reason, pharmacists can
unintentionally dispense counterfeit, adulterated, or misbranded medicine to patients. Simply put,
bad drugs can lead to bad outcomes. Patients may experience loss of therapeutic benefits, become
ill, and, in extreme cases, death. To ensure drug quality, pharmaceutical manufacturers execute
quality control and other current good manufacturing practices (cGMP). cGMP is among the GxPs,
or Good “x” family of guidelines, where x is manufacturing, laboratory, research, engineering,
documentation, etc. These guidelines are created collaboratively by agencies such as the US Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Global International Council for Harmonization of
Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH). GxP guidelines are intended
to provide accountability and traceability to the “x” activity. cGMP itself generally refers to the
requirements outlined in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1998 (FD&C Act), Section
501(a)(2)(B). It is generally accepted that by following cGMPs, undesirable events will be
mitigated. However, following cGMP does not provide a guarantee against adulterated or defective
drugs. Further, many manufacturers fail to meet cGMP standards at all (Campbell and Lodder,
2021).
The FD&C Act requirement for drug manufacturers to follow cGMP is enforceable by the
FDA (FDA, 2016; “Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ß501(a)(2)(B), 21 U.S.C. ß351,” 1998).
Despite this, many manufacturers still fail to meet cGMP standards. Lack of compliance is often
unintentional; however, sometimes deliberate fraud occurs (Campbell and Lodder, 2021; Eban,
2019; Evana et al., 2019; Mu and Carroll, 2016; Okoye and Nwoka, 2019). Regardless of the
intent, manufacturers failing to meet cGMP standards have occupied FDA inspectors for decades.
Indeed, the FDA now conducts quality testing of products and perform on-site inspections of drug
manufacturing firms. However, with limited resources, the FDA has struggled to keep up with the
demands. By the end of the fiscal year (FY) of 2019, the number of drug manufacturing sites
worldwide totaled 4,273, down 8.6% from the previous year (FDA, 2020a). Yet only 1,258 drug
quality surveillance inspections were conducted of these firms. For data regarding the number of
on-site inspections conducted, the FDA provides a database that may be reviewed at
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/fdatrack/view/track.cfm?program=oip&status=public&id
=OIP-Number-of-inspections-completed-in-country-by commodity&fy=2020.
Further, the FDA relied on European Union (EU) regulators under the Mutual Recognition
Agreement to conduct 109 drug quality inspections in the EU region (FDA, 2020a; FDA and EU,
2017). Despite the decrease in total manufacturing sites and reliance on EU regulators, the FDA
reported a decrease of more than 4% in annual domestic on-site inspections performed over two
years (FY17-19) (FDA, 2020a). On the other hand, more than a 6% increase in on-site inspections
in India was reported. However, the total percentage of foreign manufacturers decreased from
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61% to 58% from FY2018 to FY2019. Therefore, it seems the FDA may lack the necessary
resources to frequently inspect domestic and foreign drug manufacturing sites (FDA, 2019, 2020a).
The reasoning behind FDA’s reduced inspections was briefly alluded to by the organization
in response to the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) preliminary findings
of the FDA's performance (Denigan-Macauley, 2019). In a report released by GAO (GAO-20262T), a testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, the Committee on
Energy and Commerce, and the US House of Representatives, the GAO outlined that between the
FYs of 2016 and 2018, both foreign and domestic inspections decreased by approximately 10%
and 13% respectively. In response, the FDA attributed the decrease to job vacancies, claiming that
in June of 2018, the FDA employed 190 investigators capable of conducting foreign inspections,
but by November, the FDA had 58 vacancies(Denigan-Macauley, 2019).
Facing shrinking resources and persistent demand, the FDA relies now more than ever on
state-of-the-art tools to effectively redistribute the available workforce. Applying today's
technology to computable tasks allows human workers to focus on and more adequately tackle the
complex intricacies of the pharmaceutical supply chain (PSC). Proper redistribution of the FDA's
workforce could help increase the identification and elimination of potential threats to the PSC.
This paper provides a brief review of the FDA's current methods. The section “Risk-Based
Site Selection” focuses on the FDA's site-selection model (SSM) for on-site inspections. The
section “Analytical Testing” provides a brief description of the FDA's role in drug quality testing.
Finally, a brief description of tools and campaigns developed to educate both consumers and
supply chain personnel regarding risk in distributing and purchasing drugs is discussed.

Risk-Based Site Selection
On-site inspections are intended to verify a manufacturing firm’s compliance with cGMP.
The basis for cGMP can be found in the Code of Federal Regulations (https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfcfr/CFRSearch.cfm?CFRPart=211).
As
outlined in the FD&C Act, domestic drug manufacturing firms must be inspected at least once
every two years. However, fulfilling this requirement has proven difficult since the establishment
of the FD&C Act in 1998. This may be partially due to the globalization and increased
complexities of the PSC (Singh, 2016). Indeed, most drug manufacturing firms are now located
overseas (Baldwin, 2012; FDA, 2017a, 2019; Woodcock, 2019). Lacking the necessary resources,
the FDA was unable to keep the FD&C Act requirement. Failing to conduct biennial inspections
of domestic drug firms, the FDA responded by introducing a risk-based site-selection model in the
FY2005 (CDER, 2018). The model is an outcome of the FDA's pharmaceutical cGMPs for the
21st-century initiative that was first announced in 2002 (FDA, 2004b). The initiative aimed to
ensure FDA policies and actions were risk-based and scientifically backed. Developed through
expert opinion, recall history, and other FDA records, the risk-based SSM ranks manufacturing
sites for inspection.
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Figure 1: Representative conceptual layout of FDA's risk-based site-selection model (SSM). Where the model
theoretically inputs a manufacturing site to be analyzed in terms of risk factors. Beginning by dividing the site into
three general groups: Process, Products, and Facility. Further division of these general groups then takes place.
Breaking each group into categories of risk, such as product recall history. Once a site's relevant characteristics are
deconstructed into risk categories, risk-factors are then itemized. Such risk factors include a facility's production
type (e.g., packing facility, API production, labeling facility) and process hazards such as environmental
contaminants (e.g., the process using significant amounts of hazardous material). Each risk factor contributes to a
weighted risk potential for each general group (FDA, 2004a).The estimated combined risk potential for the site is
then calculated through a linear combination of these groups (FDA, 2004a). Hierarchical map modified from (FDA,
2004a).

The SSM was developed through what the FDA describes as a "multi-step analytical
process," which consists of (1) hazard identification, (2) conceptual modeling, (3) risk estimation,
and (4) risk filtering (FDA, 2004a). Hazard identification was conducted by gathering qualitative
data from experts in fields such as investigative inspection. These experts were then asked to
answer questions such as “In your experience, what are the principal factors important in predicting
adverse impacts to drug quality?” and then asked follow-up questions such as “What variables are
associated with, or predictive of, those hazards?” (FDA, 2004a). This step was intended to be an
initial brainstorming stage and identified 70 potential risk factors (FDA, 2004a). Next, the potential
risk factors were filtered, eliminating duplicates and those difficult to quantify. With the remaining
risk factors, a conceptual model was constructed. Organized by FDA personnel, risk factors were
connected based on generality and relationship. The resulting conceptual framework is
summarized in Figure 1.
Examining Figure 1, the SSM analyzes a manufacturing site in terms of risk factors. The
model first divides a manufacturing site into three general groups: Process, Products, and Facility.
Further division of these groups then takes place. Breaking each group into categories of risk, such
as product recall history. Once a site's relevant characteristics are deconstructed into risk
categories, risk factors are then listed out. Risk factors include a facility's production type (e.g.,
packing facility, API production, labeling facility) and process hazards (e.g., the process using
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significant amounts of hazardous material). Each risk factor can be thought to contribute to a
weighted risk potential for each of the general groups (Process, Products, and Facility) (FDA,
2004a). That is the risk potential for each general group is a combination of the weighted risk
factors. The estimated combined risk potential for the site is calculated through a linear
combination of these groups (FDA, 2004a). Although the pilot SSM's exact algorithm has not been
released, it may be assumed from documents provided by the FDA that the linear combination
takes on a form similar to that illustrated through Equations 1and 2. . By allowing the column
vector 𝑣⃗!,# to represent risk factor 𝑖 belonging to group 𝑗 (e.g., Process, Products, or Facility) for
site 𝑘 a and by assuming that the assignment of the 𝑤!,# 𝑡ℎ weight factor corresponds to the 𝑣!,# 𝑡ℎ
risk factor, then the combined weighted risk factors for group 𝑗 can be thought to take the form of
Equation 1.
𝑤
33⃗$,% ∗ 𝑣⃗$,% = 𝑅% Equation 1
Where, 𝑤
,,⃗!,# is the row vector representation of weight factors, corresponding to risk factors
with the column vector 𝑣⃗!,# . Then 𝑅# represents the mathematical combination of weighted risk
factors belonging to group 𝑗 (Process, Products, or Facility). It should be noted that the weighted
risk factors are numerically discrete values and the weight factor assigned to select risk factors are
determined by expert opinion, empirical evidence or a mixture of both (FDA, 2004a).
Lastly, the potential risk of site 𝑘 is given by linearly combining 𝑅# for each group and can
be thought of as taking the form of Equation 2.
𝑎𝑅& + 𝑏𝑅' + 𝑐𝑅( = 𝑅)! Equation 2.

Where 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 are scalar constants and 𝑅$,%,& is 𝑅# with 𝑗 = 1,2,3 representing the Process,
Products and Facility group respectively. Then the output of this model is a numerical value
𝑅(! representing a site 𝑆) risk potential based upon the linear combination of groups 𝑅# . A simple
python script is provided to illustrate the model (an Octave script can be provided upon request).
Type in some test numbers and see how these equations act.
https://colab.research.google.com/drive/1A1DZ1ExxhsJjG2Wbj6zbW74pNg7yhcsl?usp=sharing
In essence, the SSM model attempts to represent a manufacturer's potential failure through
mathematically combining weighted risk factors into one numerical value (e.g., 𝑆) ). This score is
then thought to be used to prioritize on-site inspections. That is given a scenario where
manufacturer A is more likely to produce suboptimal drug products than manufacturer B according
to the respective 𝑆) scores. Then manufacturer A will be prioritized for on-site inspection by the
FDA over manufacturer B. Therefore, the SSM allows FDA investigators to focus their efforts on
high-risk sites.
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Analytical Testing
Pharmaceutical manufacturing requires among the highest quality standards of any
industry. However, batch to batch and sometimes item to item variation is an inescapable element
of process manufacturing (Xie and Schenkendorf, 2019). To mitigate the risk to product quality
introduced by these inconsistencies, drug manufacturers are tasked with validation activities such
as testing batches to ensure high-quality production is maintained (e.g., a product free from
contaminants and reproducibly delivers the therapeutic benefit described on the label Woodcock,
2004). Despite this requirement, impurities are not always identified before distribution. Such
events occur in other types of manufacturing, such as food, where a defective fruit, for example,
may slip into distribution. However, this is typically less of an issue, given that a defective orange
can be inspected at the consumer level for quality. This is not the case for drug products where
visual detection of counterfeit, adulterated or misbranded medicine is nearly impossible. Instead,
specialized equipment must be used that the everyday patient does not have access to, such as
infrared spectrometry (Galante et al., 1990). Hence, the FDA must conduct quality testing for
patients. In FY2019 FDA, laboratories analyzed nearly 734 drug samples (FDA, 2020a). Included
in the drugs tested was Valsartan, a common blood pressure medication. After receiving notice
that Valsartan was potentially contaminated with N-nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA), an impurity
with potential carcinogenic properties (Mahase, 2019; Pottegård et al., 2018) The FDA responded
by developing a method to detect and quantify NDMA and other nitrosamine impurities in
angiotensin II receptor blockers (ARB's) (FDA, 2020a). Valsartan was then tested for NDMA in
FDA laboratories, where the initial claims were confirmed. These results prompted a recall of
many ARB's in the US, including Valsartan, Losartan, Irbesartan, and Olmesartan (Farrukh et al.,
2019). Following this recall, in June 2019, NDMA was found in Ranitidine by Valisure, an online
pharmacy that tests each batch of products before disturbing to customers (Valisure, 2019). In
response, the FDA again developed a method to detect and quantify NDMA in Ranitidine. In total,
the FDA for the FY2019 would develop methods to detect and quantify eight different types of
nitrosamines for ten different drugs (FDA, 2020a). Following the FDA's initial notification,
Valisure then submitted a citizens' petition in September 2019 to have Ranitidine removed from
shelves for public safety. The petition may be reviewed here: https://www.valisure.com/wpcontent/uploads/Valisure-Ranitidine-FDA-Citiz
en-Petition-v4.12.pdf.
In response to the seemingly sudden uptake in nitrosamine impurities, the FDA sent out 23
investigators globally to investigate sites related to the recalls, of which 61% of whom received a
report of OAI or official action indicated—suggesting that many of the sites affected by the recalls
were not in full compliance with cGMP (FDA, 2020a). However, there are indicators that using
the solvent dimethylformamide (DMF) in synthesizing the API in Valsartan's case is to blame (Parr
and Joseph, 2019). Further, DMF is classified as a Group 2A probable human carcinogen by the
World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Association for Research of Cancer
(IARC) (Society, 2019). Despite this, the FDA deemed 8,800,000 nanograms safe for daily intake
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limits; this prompted Valisure in June 2019 to issue another citizen's petition to the FDA,
requesting lower daily intake limits of DMF and a recall of all Valsartan processed with this
solvent. The citizen petition submitted by Valisure can be reviewed here:
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2019-P-2869-0001.
Given that arguably the two most extensive recalls in the past couple of years have been initiated
by Valisure and not the FDA, it seems the FDA may benefit from aid in this area of surveying
the PSC. Luckily, Valisure has inspired other quality testing pharmacies to emerge, such as the
University of Kentucky (UK) Central Pharmacy. Here, the injectable medication used within the
UK hospital is undergoing quality testing. Similar quality testing sites will likely begin to appear
as more recalls and safety alerts result from such work. Collaboration between the FDA and
these “second check” pharmacies will be critical for optimized drug quality testing. Another
tactic to catch faulty batches of drugs is to use patient and physician reports. This topic will be
touched on in the next section.

Consumer Tools
In addition to providing guidelines, on-site inspections, and quality analysis testing, the
FDA also provides tools for patients and physicians to participate in drug surveillance. MedWatch
is an online tool that allows patients, doctors, and consumers to voluntarily report potential risks
to the FDA (FDA, 2020b). MedWatch accepts reports regarding prescription and over-the-counter
(OTC) medicines, biologics, medical devices, combination products (e.g., nasal spray), cosmetics,
and foods. MedWatch volunteers are prompted to fill out either a 3500 or 3500B form depending
on the individual's role as a health professional or consumer/patient. Once the appropriate form is
selected, the system generates a report ID. The system records the report date, demographic
information, and description of the potential risk before allowing the reporter to submit the form
to the FDA electronically. Using this information, the FDA can quickly identify threats and, when
needed, issue safety alerts informed from this tool. MedWatch can be easily accessed at
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/medwatch/index.cfm?action=reporting.home.
Supplementary to encouraging patient participation, the FDA also provides educational tools to
lower consumer risk.
The FDA provides several educational campaigns to lower consumer risk. For example,
the BeSafeRx campaign raises awareness about the dangers of buying prescription medicines from
fake online pharmacies (FDA, 2015). BeSafeRx provides tips on identifying safe online
pharmacies, such as ensuring the pharmacy is licensed within the patient's state's board of
pharmacy. To supplement this, the FDA provides a database in which such information can be
received quickly. This database can be explored at:
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/besaferx-know-your-online-pharmacy/know-your-online-pharmacy.
The FDA does not limit developing educational campaigns and tools to consumers.
Manufacturers and other supply chain personnel can also find aid through tools such as the supply
chain security tool kit. Developed through a collaboration with the Asia Pacific Economic
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Cooperation, the FDA created the supply chain security tool kit focusing on medical products
(FDA, 2017b). Constructed to improve supply chain security, the tool kit addresses vulnerabilities
in the medical product supply chain. It provides recommendations on best practices to prevent and
detect substandard medical products before reaching consumers (FDA, 2017b). The educational
tool kit was developed to provide training material to educate its readers on the supply chain by
covering ten categories:
● good manufacturing practices
● good distribution practices
● good import/export practices
● clinical/retail pharmacy practices
● product security
● detection technology
● internet sales
● track and trace systems
● surveillance and monitoring
● single points of contact
The full tool kit can be accessed at:
http://www.nifds.go.kr/apec/SupplyChain/APEC_SupplyChainToolkit_170317.pdf.

Conclusion
Pharmaceutical manufacturers execute quality control and other GMP to provide safe highquality drugs. The FDA is tasked with ensuring manufacturers are performing such procedures.
Faced with limited resources, the FDA has developed novel tools to aid supply chain oversight,
including a risk-based approach to prioritizing on-site inspections and analytical testing of drugs
in FDA laboratories. However, arguably two of the largest recalls in recent years were initiated
by Valisure, not the FDA. The success of Valisure has since inspired other quality testing
pharmacies such as the UK Central Pharmacy to emerge. Lastly, the FDA provides tools to
encourage participation and education of quality manufacturing for both patients and supply
chain personnel.
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